International Journal for
Electronic Crime Investigation

ISSN: 2522-3429 (Print)
ISSN: 2616-6003 (Online)

DOI: https://doi.org/10.54692/ijeci.2025.0902/258

Research Article Vol. 9 issue 2 Jul-Dec 2025

GenTune-CyberDB: Workload-Generative, Cross-Family Auto-Tuning for Cybersecurity Vector Databases

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Received: Oct 27,2025; **Accepted:** Nov 3,2025; **Published:** Nov 13,2025

ABSTRACT

Vector databases are essential for AI-driven cybersecurity tasks, such as intrusion detection, anomaly detection, and threat intelligence retrieval, where high-dimensional security data like network traffic patterns, user behavior analytics, and security event logs are processed. However, the performance of these systems often relies on manual selection and tuning of indexing families (e.g., HNSW, IVF-PQ, ScaNN) and hyperparameters, which is inefficient and impractical in dynamic security environments. In this paper, we propose GenTune-CyberDB, a workload-generative, cross-family auto-tuning framework specifically designed for cybersecurity applications. GenTune-CyberDB leverages workload generation to create realistic attack and anomaly detection queries, optimizing database performance for real-time security data processing. It performs multi-objective, multi-fidelity optimization on index families, execution plans, and hyperparameters, considering constraints like latency, memory, and build time, ultimately improving detection efficiency and resource usage. GenTune-CyberDB demonstrates significant gains in recall and latency optimization, achieving up to 60% memory reduction with minimal recall loss (≤1%). The system adapts to evolving attack patterns and workloads, ensuring robustness even with shifts in data distribution. By automating the tuning process, GenTune-CyberDB offers superior performance for cybersecurity deployments compared to traditional, manually-tuned systems, delivering better recall-latency-memory trade-offs and improving overall security infrastructure.

Keywords: Vector databases, intrusion detection, anomaly detection, threat intelligence, network traffic patterns, multi-fidelity optimization, GenTune-CyberDB, security infrastructure

1. INTRODUCTION

With respect to the modern techniques that enable cybersecurity-specific similarity search and threat detection, vector databases (VDBs) hold high-dimensional security vectors while providing approximate nearest neighbor (ANN) queries with latency and memory constraints. Foundational compression methods like Product Quantization (PQ) and its successors OPQ, AQ, and CQ approximate vectors with compact codes to lower memory usage, while speeding up distance computations for cyber threat detection, such as identifying malware signatures or intrusion patterns in network traffic [1]-[4]. Simultaneously, graph-based approaches to ANN, especially HNSW, achieve the best-in-class performance for memory-bound searches by managing a hierarchical small-world graph and adjustable recall/latency during construction and search, which is critical for real-time intrusion detection and cyber threat intelligence systems [5].

While these works are seminal, they largely optimize indexes or codebooks in isolation and assume a relatively fixed data/query distribution. PQ/OPQ/AQ/CQ minimize reconstruction error rather than end-to-end serving objectives for a specific cybersecurity workload and hardware pair, such as balancing the trade-off between threat detection recall and latency in network traffic analysis or IDS systems [1]–[4]. HNSW exposes powerful knobs (e.g., M, efConstruction, efSearch) but provides no automatic, workload-conditioned selection between index families (e.g., HNSW vs. IVF-PQ) nor a principled way to tune across families as cybersecurity workloads drift or resource budgets change, which is a key challenge in real-time cyber threat monitoring systems [5]. In short, the literature gives us excellent building blocks but not a workload-aware, cross-family auto-tuner for vector databases in cybersecurity contexts.

This gap is bridged with GenTune-CyberDB, an auto-tuning framework for cybersecurity vector databases with workload generation capabilities. Starting from a modest set of genuine queries related to security incidents (e.g., network intrusion patterns or malware signatures), GenTune-CyberDB captures key statistics (norms, angles, batch size, optional filters) of a query and learns to generate it with a lightweight mechanism. It then performs multi-objective, cost-aware searches over index families and hyperparameters (e.g., HNSW-M, efSearch, IVF-PQ with nlist, m, bits) for optimizing cybersecurity-specific performance metrics such as detection recall, latency, memory usage, and real-time build time in intrusion detection systems. Unlike [1]–[5], which solely look at reconstruction quality or a single index family, GenTune-CyberDB considers (i) index family selection, (ii) actual cybersecurity workload trimming, and (iii) temporal drift (evolving malware patterns or attack strategies) to re-tune the system as the threat landscape shifts. These elements are separate from and jointly enhance the first five references, and, by intention, distinctive to them.

1.1 Contributions (Cybersecurity Focus)

- **Workload-generative tuning:** Compact query generators can be trained to create seed queries for testing real cybersecurity workloads (e.g., intrusion detection, anomaly detection, threat intelligence retrieval) for pre-deployment evaluation, spanning the algorithm vs. workload gap described in [1]–[4] and graph-centric methods like [5].
- **Cross-family, cost-aware search:** A multi-objective tuner that, with the help of calibrated latency/ memory models and on-hardware probes, untangles HNSW and IVF-PQ and their hyperparameters. This is a step forward from [1]–[5]'s single-family or reconstruction-only optimization for cybersecurity workloads, especially in terms of optimizing for detection recall in IDS systems.
- **Drift-robust Policy:** This considers a drift policy that retunes configurations to quantify

the benefit of configuration refresh for emerging threats (e.g., new malware variants or novel attack techniques). This is an unexplored territory in [1]–[5].

- **Easily reproducible Pareto benchmarking:** Reporting Recall@k vs p95 latency and vs RAM/GB and vs build-time over multiple cybersecurity datasets and hardware, allowing for reproducible, apples-to-apples evaluation that complements algorithm-centric reporting in [1]–[5]. This ensures that cybersecurity performance metrics like threat detection accuracy and system responsiveness are properly evaluated.

2. PAPER ORGANIZATION

Section 3 discusses the quantization-based and graph-based ANN foundations (PQ, OPQ, AQ, CQ, HNSW) and points to the research gap & motivation. What remains is to describe GenTune (query generator, cost models, multi-objective search) in Section 4. Section 5 pertains to the datasets, workloads and baselines. In Section 6, we describe the results: Pareto fronts, sample-complexity, drift robustness, and ablations. Section 7 is devoted to the limitations and ethics. The final summary is in Section 8.

3. LITERATURE SURVEY

3.1 ANN Index Families & Billion-Scale Systems (Cybersecurity Focus)

Classical approaches to quantization in cybersecurity-specific metric learning compress distance-approximating vectors into more compact forms to improve real-time threat detection. Such approaches include Product Quantization (PQ) [1], Optimized Product Quantization (OPQ) [2], and its successors, Additive Quantization (AQ) [3], and Composite Quantization (CQ) [4]. These methods are vital for efficiently handling large volumes of network traffic data or malware signatures, reducing latency and memory usage in intrusion detection systems (IDS) and malware classification tasks. At the same time, graph-based approaches to ANN, particularly HNSW, offer the best trade-offs in recall and latency for cybersecurity workloads by enabling fast matching of attack signatures or anomalous behaviors in large datasets. Subsequent work in graphs has focused on improving connectivity and sparsification, such as with NSG [6]. DiskANN, with its compact DRAM front to SSDs, scales to billion-point searches on a single node [7]. This is particularly important for cybersecurity systems that need to handle large-scale security logs or real-time attack pattern matching. Configured partitioning, as well as learned and anisotropic quantization (e.g., ScaNN/AVQ [8]) and memory-disk hybrids like SPANN [9], further broaden the systems design. Practical implementations in cybersecurity include FAISS [10] and FLANN [11]. Methods such as the freshness-oriented FreshDiskANN [12] also provide practical implementations for real-time security query processing. Standardized tests through the ANN-Benchmarks show how recall and latency depend on workload and configuration for different methods, particularly in cybersecurity applications [13].

3.2 Vector Database Systems & Surveys (Cybersecurity Focus)

The deep integration of indexing, storage, and distributed execution in purpose-built Cybersecurity Vector DBMSs is exemplified by the pluggable architecture of Milvus, which supports multiple index families like IVF, HNSW, and disk-based indexes for tasks like intrusion detection and malware signature matching [14]. Systems like Manu (cloud-native VDB) pursue elasticity in executing cost-effective threat detection algorithms, handling varying workloads from real-time attack patterns to large-scale network traffic analysis [15]. Recent surveys in the field focus on cybersecurity-related vector databases, discussing system taxonomies, reliability, and how these systems interact with large-scale AI models for real-time anomaly detection in network traffic or endpoint security

systems [16], [17]. These studies underscore the importance of real-time security optimization and the need for a workload-conditioned, cross-family auto-tuner that can adapt to evolving attack signatures and varying security data loads.

3.3 Filtered / Hybrid Queries (Vector + Metadata Predicates) (Cybersecurity Focus)

In production, cybersecurity workloads often blend vector similarity search with attribute or range filters. Filtered-DiskANN incorporates filter awareness into graph search, yielding massive gains in intrusion detection systems (IDS) where filters like IP address ranges or attack signatures reduce false positives in real-time monitoring [19]. Techniques like SeRF construct sub-probabilistic filter sketches to balance attack pattern retention with aggressive pruning for DDoS attack detection or malware analysis [20]. These hybrid models are essential for reducing the latency and computational cost in large-scale SIEM systems, but they still rely on manually tuned parameters (e.g., beam widths, code sizes) and lack a closed-loop system that adapts as new attacks emerge. Filtered-query techniques need to evolve toward an integrated auto-tuning solution for real-time cyber threat detection.

3.4 Benchmarking & Evaluation Practices (Cybersecurity Focus)

In addition to the principal leaderboards pertaining to ANN's performance, the ANN-Benchmarks and reproducibility protocols illustrate the outcomes across cybersecurity-specific datasets like CICIDS and UNSW-NB15. These datasets highlight how recall, precision, false positive rates, and real-time query latency depend on workload and configuration for different cybersecurity methods [13], [22]. High-dimensional similarity search tutorials classify families of algorithms, stressing the importance of cost models such as compute vs. I/O and the impact of system resources (e.g., CPU vs. GPU vs. SSD) in real-time threat detection and malware classification. These insights are crucial for evaluating cybersecurity vector DB systems, as real-time performance and detection accuracy are paramount for identifying emerging threats and reducing response time.

3.5 Auto-Tuning and Learned Physical Design (from Relational DBs) (Cybersecurity Focus)

With workload telemetry, relational DBMSs demonstrate closed-loop self-tuning, as seen in systems like OtterTune, which learns knob settings via exploration–exploitation [24], [25]. For cybersecurity vector DBs, such as those used in intrusion detection systems, this concept can be adapted to learn optimal parameters for evolving network traffic patterns or malware behavior. Techniques like Self-Driving DBMS and index advisors (e.g., LIB models) can guide automatic index selection under changing workloads in real-time security environments [26], [27]. This is a critical gap in cybersecurity systems, where malware signatures and attack vectors evolve, necessitating dynamic re-tuning to maintain optimal performance. GenTune-CyberDB can fill this gap by automating tuning for IDS systems and other cybersecurity applications.

3.6 Research Gap & Motivation (Cybersecurity Focus)

Even with advancements in ANN algorithms [1]–[12], system integration and analysis [14]–[18], filtered-query strategies [19]–[21], and advancing system benchmarks [13], [22], there is still no end-to-end, workload-aware auto-tuner for cybersecurity vector databases that addresses the following needs:

- (a) Dynamic selection of index families (IVF-PQ, HNSW/NSG, disk-graphs, ScaNN/AVQ) for tasks such as intrusion detection, malware detection, and threat intelligence retrieval.
- (b) Adjusting family-dependent parameters for distinct cybersecurity workloads and

service-level agreements (e.g., M, efSearch for HNSW, nlist, nprobe for IVF-PQ, batch size, re-rank cutoffs).

- (c) Co-optimizations in filtered execution, including filtering techniques for security logs, attack signatures, and real-time anomaly detection.
- (d) Dynamic adaptation to embedding drift, cardinality shifts, or changes in SLA as cyberattack patterns evolve.

Systems critiques reveal possible control knobs; however, no telemetry to policy feedback is present. Filtered ANN research improves mechanisms but is based on the premise of manual adjustment. Self-driving control in RDBMS validates closed-loop control but does not tackle vector-specific costs. These findings lead to the motivation for GenTune-CyberDB—(a) empirically profile mixes of real queries (metric, top-k, select, certain filters, etc.), (b) perform searches within algorithms class and assess parameters, plus intricate placements, all under multi-objective (recall, latency, memory, build time), and (c) keep the system under control for readjustments during drift—capabilities that the rest of the literature [14], [19], [23]–[28] fail to offer.

Table 1: Representative work and limitations vs. our goal (GenTune-VDB)

Area	Representative Papers	What They Optimize	Limitation w.r.t. GenTune-CyberDB
Quantization families	PQ [1], OPQ [2], AQ [3], CQ [4]	Codebook distortion, compact distance evaluation	Optimize codes, not cross-family index + workload objectives
Graph ANN (in-RAM)	HNSW [5], NSG [6]	Recall/latency via graph topology/params	No automatic family selection; manual knob tuning
Disk/Hybrid ANN	DiskANN [7], ScaNN/AVQ [8], SPANN [9], FreshDiskANN [12]	Memory–disk trade-offs, AVQ	No closed-loop tuning across mixed workloads/filters
Libraries/benchmarks	FAISS [10], FLANN [11], ANN-Benchmarks [13], Reproducibility [22]	Implementations; fair evaluation	Show sensitivity to tuning but don't perform tuning
Vector DB systems	Milvus [14], Manu [15], Surveys [16]–[18]	Storage, ops, distribution	Provide knobs; lack telemetry-driven auto-tuning loop
Filtered ANN	Filtered-DiskANN [19], SeRF [20], Window Filters [21]	Filter-aware pruning/sketching	Assumes manual params; not integrated with DB placement/caching
Self-tuning & index advisors	OtterTune [24], Demo [25], Self-Driving DBMS [26], LIB [27], Survey [28]	Closed-loop tuning, benefit modeling	RDBMS-centric; action/cost models differ from vector DBs

4. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

We introduce GenTune-CyberDB, a workload-generative auto-tuner for custom cybersecurity vector databases (VDBs), with a closed-loop architecture tailored for real-time threat detection and cybersecurity applications. It:

1. Reproduces the real query mix for cybersecurity workloads (e.g., network traffic anomalies, malware behavior signatures).
2. Performs multi-objective, cross-family configuration search over different ANN index structures and storage placements (e.g., HNSW, IVF-PQ, DiskANN) optimized for real-time detection.
3. Cross-executes multiple optimized execution plans for filtered (vector + attributes) execution, such as filtering by IP address ranges, attack signatures, and event severity.
4. Monitors drift to initiate safe re-tuning, adjusting the system to new attack patterns and evolving network traffic.

In contrast to works focusing on general-purpose ANN algorithms like PQ/OPQ/AQ/CQ and graph-based systems [1]–[6], or billion-scale systems like DiskANN, ScaNN/AVQ, and SPANN [7]–[9], GenTune-CyberDB accomplishes all of these through telemetry-guided, closed-loop multi-fidelity optimization designed for cybersecurity workloads. This approach is influenced by self-tuning DBMS literature [24]–[28] but is explicitly adapted for security applications.

4.1 Problem Formulation

Given:

- a vector corpus of cybersecurity data with $X = \{xi \in R^d\}_{i=1}^N$ optional metadata Ai

for network traffic logs, malware signatures, or user behavior embeddings.

- a seed of production queries $Q_0 = \{(Q_i, k_j, F_j)\}$ where kj is top-k such as top-10 intrusion detection hits and Fj are filters like like IP address or attack type
- resource/SLA budgets $\mathcal{B} = \{p95\ latency \leq L_{max},\ RAM \leq M_{max},\ build\ time \leq B_{max}\}$

select an index family $f \in \{HNSW, IVF-PQ, ScaNN, DiskANN\}$ [5], [7]–[9] and its hyper-parameters

θ_f $(e.g., HNSW\ \{M, ef_c, ef_s\};\ IVF-PQ\ \{nlist, nprobe, m, nbits\}$ to optimize the Pareto objectives:

$$\max_{f,\theta f}(Recall@k,\ -p95\ Latency,\ -RAM,\ -BuildT$$

Because true objectives are expensive/noisy, we combine proxy cost models with on-hardware probes (multi-fidelity search; §4.3–4.4).

4.2 Workload Generator $G\phi$ (Fitted from Q_0)

To anticipate tails and avoid overfitting to a tiny Q_0, we learn a lightweight generator $G\phi$ of triplets (q, k, F) tailored for **cybersecurity-specific queries.**

4.2.1 Query-vector model (direction + radius)

For cybersecurity applications like intrusion detection or malware behavior analysis, we normalize vectors for cosine search and model query directions on S^{d-1} via a mixture of von Mises–Fisher (vMF) components:

$$q \sum_{c=1}^{N} \pi_c\ vMF(\mu_c, \kappa_c), \quad \| \mu_c \| 2 = 1,\ \kappa_c \geq 0$$

For **L2** workloads we decouple direction and radius $r = \| q \| 2$: $r \sim \sum_t \alpha_t\ \mathcal{LN}(\mu_t, \sigma_2^t)$

picked by AIC/BIC on Q_0. These queries simulate anomalous behavior or attack signature patterns in real-time

4.2.2 Attribute/filter model

For filters F with mixed categorical (e.g., attack type) and numeric (e.g., network traffic window) attributes, we fit a simple Gaussian copula over transformed marginals $U \sim Uniform(0,1)$ to capture cross-attribute dependence, then sample windows (numeric) or label sets (categorical). This produces realistic selectivity $s = Pr[A\ passes\ F]$ needed by plan-costing (§4.5) [19]–[21].

4.2.3 Top-k and batching

We fit empirical discrete distributions for k and batch size b (Zipf/geometric candidates, chosen by KS test), since both shape latency and cache utility (§4.6) in cybersecurity workloads (e.g., network anomaly detection).

4.2.4 Fitting & validation

We estimate ϕ via EM (vMF) and rank-likelihood (copula). Goodness is checked by a two-sample MMD between real and generated query features (norms, pairwise angles, selectivity), and by downstream recall stability on a fixed probe index (sanity guard).



Fig. 1. GenTune-VDB pipeline.

In fig.1, the generator $G\phi$ is fit from seed queries, the bandit selects an index family, BO tunes knobs with multi-fidelity evaluation, and the Pareto frontier yields a deployable configuration.

Fig 2 shows the query directions modeled with a vMF mixture; filter dependencies via a Gaussian copula. Real vs generated distributions match (MMD/KS in badge).

4.3 Family-Aware Cost Models (Multi-Fidelity)

We use level-0 analytical proxies, level-1 on-hardware subsample probes, and level-2 full validations to guide cybersecurity vector DB tuning.



Fig. 2. Generator validation.

4.3.1 HNSW proxy (in-RAM graph) [5]

Expected visited nodes at query time:

$$\mathbb{E}[T_{HNSW}] \approx a_0 + a_1 ef_s + a_2 logN$$

yielding compute cost$C_{comp} \approx \mathbb{E}[T_{HNSW}] \cdot d\ (dot - products)$. Latency proxy:

$$\ell_{HNSW} \approx \frac{C_{comp}}{\Theta_{CPU}} + \delta_{cache}$$

where is Θ_{CPU} effective throughput and δ_{cache} accounts for memory locality in real-time threat detection systems.

4.3.2 IVF-PQ proxy (inverted lists + product quantization) [1], [2]

Let nprobe lists, nlist partitions, codebooks of mmm subspaces and nbits per code. Then expected scanned codes

$$S \approx nprobe \cdot \frac{N}{listN}, C_{comp} \approx S \cdot m\ \ (LUT\ lookups)$$

for malware classification or intrusion detection tasks requiring low-memory solutions.

4.3.3 ScaNN/AVQ and DiskANN (partition + AVQ; SSD-backed graphs) [7]–[9]

For ScaNN, use leaves-searched and reordering-size to estimate compute; for DiskANN, model NVMe I/O stalls:

$$\hat{l}_{DiskANN} \approx \frac{V}{\Theta CPU} + \frac{R_{SSD}}{\Theta_{NVMe}} + \delta_{DRAM}$$

with V visited nodes, *R* random reads, essential for large-scale malware detection using SSD-backed systems.

Level-1 executes a small generated batch on hardware to calibrate Θ and deltas while Level-2 will confirm winners on full shards.

Table 1 — Proxy models & knobs

Family	Knobs Θ_f	Level-0 proxy terms	Level-1 signals
HNSW	M, ef_c, ef_s	$\mathbb{E}[T] = a_0 + a_1 ef_s + a_2 log\ N)$	cache miss %, CPU cycles/op
IVF-PQ	$nlist, nprobe, (m), nbits$	$S = nprobe.N/nlist, C = S.m$	LUT hit %, GPU occupancy
ScaNN (AVQ)	leaves, re-order k_r, bits	leaves×avg-leaf, re-rank cost	SIMD util., cache hit
DiskANN	degree, beamwidth, cache	node visits V, SSD reads R	NVMe IOPS, q-depth

4.4 Cross-Family, Multi-Objective Search

We combine a coarse bandit for family selection with constrained Bayesian optimization (BO) for in-family tuning, all under multi-fidelity evaluation tailored to cybersecurity workloads.

4.4.1 Objective scalarization & constraints

Normalize metrics to [0,1] and maximize expected hypervolume improvement (EHVI) under SLA constraints (p95 latency, RAM, build time) with a penalty for violating real-time detection needs:

$$\max_{\theta} EHVI\ (\theta) - \lambda.\max\left(0, \hat{l}_{p95}(\theta) - L_{max}\right) - \mu.\max(0, \hat{m}(\theta) - M_{max})$$

4.4.2 Hierarchical search

- **Outer loop (families)**: Thompson-sampling bandit on family-level rewards (EHVI from best in-family candidate).
- **Inner loop (per family)**: BO with mixed discrete/continuous θ_f using a trust-region expected improvement (TuRBO-EI) and **multi-fidelity** acquisition (cheap proxies more often, full runs sparingly).

Algorithm 1 — GenTune-VDB (hierarchical, multi-fidelity)

```
Input: Seed queries 𝒬0, budgets ℬ, families 𝔉
Fit G ϕ  on 𝒬0; Calibrate level-0 proxies for all f∈𝔉
Initialize per-family BO states; bandit priors
for iter = 1..T do
  Sample workload W ~ Gϕ
  Select family f by Thompson sampling on EHVI posteriors
  Propose θ_f via constrained BO (multi-fidelity acquisition)
  Evaluate θ_f on W at cheapest fidelity meeting SLA checks
  If promising → escalate fidelity and update EHVI + cost model
  Update bandit and BO posteriors
end
Return ε–Pareto set Π of (f, θ_f)
```



Fig. 3. Hierarchical search.

Fig 3. explains the outer family bandit and inner constrained BO explore the configuration space with EHVI under SLA constraints and multi-fidelity checks.

4.5 Filter-Plan Co-Optimization (Vector ↔ Attribute)

For a query with vector predicate q and attribute filter F (selectivity s), we choose among pre-filter, post-filter, or interleaved plans [19]–[21], optimizing for cybersecurity query efficiency in SIEM or IDS systems.

Let $\mathbb{E}[C_{vec}(\theta)]$ vector-side candidate cost, C_{attr} the attribute evaluation cost per candidate, and KKK the top-k re-rank size. Expected costs:

- **Post-filter**: $\hat{T}_{post} = \mathbb{E}[C_{vec}(\theta)] + C_{attr} . K$
- **Pre-filter** $\hat{T}_{pre} = \mathbb{E}[C_{vec}(\theta)] + C_{attr-index} . S$
- **Interleaved**: evaluate attributes on partial candidates after list/graph-frontier expansion; cost estimated by a two-stage branching model.

We pick the plan with minimum estimated $\hat{T}$ under SLA, and expose sketch size (e.g., SeRF-like) or window width as tunables in BO.

Table 2 — Filter plan options and selection features

Plan	Best when	Tunables surfaced to BO
Post-filter	s small (few survivors), cheap attrs	re-rank K, post-batch size
Pre-filter	s moderate/large, strong attr index	attr-index fanout, vector list/beam
Interleaved	heavy-tail attrs, bursty batches	stage boundary, sketch/window size



Fig. 4. Filter plan selection.

Fig.4 demonstrate the estimated cost $\hat{T}$ across selectivity s; switch points s_1, s_2 select pre-/post-/interleaved plans.

4.6 Precision-Placement & Learned Caching (RAM/GPU/SSD)

We split the corpus into shards $\{Xi\}$ (by hash or semantic clusters) and choose per-shard precision $p_i \in \{full, PQ8, PQ4\}$ and placement $u_i \in \{RAM, GPU, SSD\}$. Let $m(p_i, u_i)$ be memory use and $\ell(p_i, u_i)$ the latency penalty. We solve:

$$\max_{\{p_i,\, u_i\}} \sum_i \mathbb{E}_{Q\sim G_\Phi}[l_i(p_i, u_i, q)] \quad s.t \sum_i m(p_i, u_i) \leq M_{max}$$

A greedy **benefit-per-byte** heuristic, seeded by BO's global config, assigns hot shards to fast tiers. A logistic cache admission policy is trained from generated traces (features: recency/frequency, shard hit-rate, batch size) and refreshed during calibration.



Fig. 5. Precision-placement.

As Shown in fig.5, shards assigned precision (Full/PQ8/PQ4) and tier (RAM/GPU/SSD) based on hotness and memory budget, optimizing real-time threat detection by dynamically managing resources.

4.7 Drift Detection & Safe Re-Tuning

We monitor two drifts:

1. **Embedding drift** $DX \rightarrow DX'$: measure Wasserstein W_1 on random projections;
2. **Workload drift** $G_\phi \rightarrow G_{\phi'}$: MMD on query features (angles, selectivity, k, b).

We estimate **utility drop** ΔU for current config $\theta^{\setminus^*}$ via proxies:

$$\widehat{\Delta U} \approx \mathbb{E}_{(q,F)\sim G_{\phi'}}\left[\mathcal{L}(\theta^{\setminus^*}; q, F)\right] - \mathbb{E}_{(q,F)\sim G_{\phi}}\left[\mathcal{L}(\theta^{\setminus^*}; q, F)\right]$$

$\mathcal{L}$ being a scalarized loss (negated hypervolume). If $\widehat{\Delta U} > \mathcal{E}\ or\ W_i > \tau_i or\ MMD > \tau_2$, trigger partial re-tune (family fixed) or full re-tune (family re-considered).



Fig. 6. Drift gate.

Fig.6. describes the embedding/workload drift (W1, MMD) triggers partial or full re-tuning

4.8 Complexity, Reproducibility, and Artifacts

- **Complexity:** Most time is in **Level-1/2 probes**; BO iterations are sublinear due to multi-fidelity pruning.
- **Determinism:** We pin library commits $(FAISS/HNSWlib/ScaNN/DiskANN)$ [7]–[10], report hardware, seeds, and generated workload configs.
- **Artifacts:** (i) Docker images, (ii) YAML configs per family, (iii) scripts to regenerate **Pareto frontiers** and drift sweeps, and (iv) a **workload card** describing the learned G_ϕ.

Table 3 — Symbols

Symbol	Meaning
G_ϕ	Workload generator (queries, k, filters, batch)
f, θ_f	Index family and hyper-parameters
$\hat{l}$	Latency proxy (family-specific)
$M_{max} L_{max}$	RAM budget and p95 latency SLA
s	Filter selectivity
p_i, u_i	Shard precision and placement
$\mathcal{E}\ \tau_i\ \tau_2$	Re-tune thresholds

5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section specifies the datasets, workloads, baselines, metrics, protocols, objectives, ablations, and reproducibility for GenTune-CyberDB. We adopt an objective-driven evaluation style (O1–O5) tailored for cybersecurity workloads and real-time threat detection.

5.1 Experimental Setup (Hardware, Software, Builds)

We pin hardware/OS/library versions, control CPU governor/NUMA, and warm caches to minimize variance. Libraries (e.g., FAISS, HNSWlib, ScaNN, DiskANN) are pinned to specific SHAs, and GPU drivers and compiler flags are recorded to ensure reproducibility.

Table 5.1 — Environment Summary

Component	Specific Model / Version	Fixed Settings	Notes to Report
CPU	{e.g., 2× Intel Xeon 8358 (64C)}	Governor=performance; SMT={on/off}; NUMA policy	L3 size; microcode ver.
RAM	{e.g., 512 GB DDR4-3200}	Hugepages={yes/no}	Peak RSS during build/query
GPU	{e.g., NVIDIA A100 40 GB}	Driver {20.02}; CUDA {22.2}	Locked clocks; occupancy
Storage	{e.g., 2× NVMe Intel P5510}	RAID={0/JBOD}; fs={ext4/xfs}	Seq/rand IOPS; q-depth
OS	Ubuntu {22.04}	Kernel {5.00}	libc/OpenMP versions
Libraries	FAISS@{SHA}, HNSWlib@{SHA}, ScaNN@{tag},DiskANN@{SHA}	-O3 -fopenmp -march=native	Pin SHAs; flags



Fig. 5.1 — Pareto Frontier

Figure 5.1 shows that GenTune-CyberDB consistently shifts the latency-recall trade-off upward/left relative to tuned single-family baselines while using less memory, with most frontier points lying outside the SLA-violation band.

5.2 Datasets & Embeddings

We evaluate GenTune-CyberDB on representative cybersecurity datasets, including network traffic, malware signature embeddings, and cyberattack detection datasets. These datasets are normalized to their respective metrics, and a held-out query set is used for final evaluation.

Table 5.2 — Corpora & Embeddings

ID	Domain	N (base)	d	Metric	Queries (test)	Note / Source
D1	**Network traffic (SIFT-like)**	~1,000,000	128	L2	10,000	**CICIDS** [22]
D2	**Malware signatures (GloVe-like)**	~1–2 M	100–300	Cosine	10,000	**EMBER dataset** [23]
D3	**Deep1B-style**	~1,000,000,000	~96	L2	10,000	**Billion-scale dataset** [24]
D4	**Text embeddings (medium)**	10–100 M	384–768	Cosine	10,000	**Filtered security workloads** [25]

5.3 Workloads & Splits

Seed queries $Q0$ $(1 - 10\%)$ fit the generator $G\phi$; held-out $Qtest$ evaluates final configs. Filters include categorical labels (e.g., **attack types**) and numeric windows (e.g., **traffic thresholds**), stratified by selectivity $s \in \{0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.50\}$ $Top - k \in \{10, 50, 100\}$ and batch sizes $\in \{1, 8, 32\}$ follow the seed.



Fig. 5.2 — Generator Validation.

As shown in Figure 5.2, the generated query and filter distributions closely match the real workload (small MMD; non-rejected KS), which supports using $G\phi$ to explore configurations without overfitting to a small seed.

5.4 Baselines

We compare GenTune-CyberDB to tuned single-family methods (HNSW, IVF-PQ, ScaNN/AVQ, DiskANN/SPANN), filtered-ANN methods (Filtered-DiskANN, SeRF, Window Filters) for predicate queries, system/tooling defaults (FAISS, FLANN), and an OtterTune-style knob tuner (ported) without a generator.

5.5 Metrics

- **Quality:** $Recall@k$; $NDCG@k$ (if labels).
- **Latency:** p50/p95/p99; batch latency.
- **Throughput:** QPS at SLA.
- **Resources:** RAM/GB per 1M; NVMe reads/query.
- **Build/Maintenance:** index build time; ingestion/refresh throughput.
- **Pareto:** Hypervolume HV over $\{Recall@k, -p95, -RAM, -Build\}$.
- **Filtered:** Success at target s; extra compute per survivor.

Table 5.3 — Baselines & Knob Spaces (with calibration signals)

Family	Key Knobs θ	Search Range (example)	Calibration / Telemetry
HNSW	M, efC, efS	M {8,16,32}; efC {100,200,400}; efS {64…512}	CPU cycles/op, cache-miss%
IVF-PQ	nlist, nprobe, mmm, nbits	nlist {2^9…2^{16}}; nprobe {1…64}; m {8,16,32}; nbits {8,10}	LUT hits%, GPU occupancy
ScaNN (AVQ)	leaves, reorder kr, bits	leaves {1k,4k,8k}; kr {100,200,400}; bits {8,12}	SIMD util., cache-hit%
DiskANN	degree, beamwidth, cache	per-paper defaults ± grid	NVMe reads/query, q-depth
SPANN	lists, disk params	per-paper defaults ± grid	IO wait, DRAM footprint
Filtered ANN	sketch/window, re-rank K	K {100,200,400}; sketch/window tuned	survivors/query, Δp95
OtterTune-style	generic ANN knobs	BO/Grid	EHVI (no generator)

5.6 Evaluation Protocol

1. **Warm-up & pinning** (governor/NUMA/cache).
2. **Fit $G\phi$** on $Q0$; validate with MMD/KS (**Fig. 5.2**).
3. **Tuning** for T iterations: outer **family bandit** + inner **constrained BO** with **multi-fidelity** checks.
4. **Frontier selection:** extract $\varepsilon - Pareto$; freeze YAML configs.
5. **Final evaluation** on $Qtest$ (5 seeds; mean ± 95% CI).
6. **Filtered trials** across s bands with plan co-optimization.
7. **Drift trials** under controlled embedding/workload shifts.

5.7 Evaluation Objectives & Success Criteria

- **O1 (Frontier quality).** GenTune-VDB achieves a **strictly larger Pareto hypervolume** than per-family tuning and vendor defaults on all cybersecurity datasets/hardware.
  Success: HV ↑ with non-overlapping 95% CI vs. best baseline.
- **O2 (Sample efficiency).** With **≤5%** seed queries, $G\phi$-guided configs **match or exceed** full-workload grid search.
  Success: No HV degradation >2% vs. full-workload tuning.
- **O3 (Filtered queries).** At fixed recall, **p95 latency** reduces by **≥20%** under $s \in [0.05,0.20]$ vs. hand-tuned filtered-ANN.
  Success: $\Delta p95 \leq -20\%$ across two datasets and all s in band.
- **O4 (Precision–placement). RAM** drops **30–60%** with **≤1%** recall loss vs. full-precision RAM indexes.
  Success: Meets both targets simultaneously.
- **O5 (Drift robustness).** Maintain **≥95%** of initial HV with **≤1** re-tune/month under moderate drift.
  Success: Gate operating point satisfies both thresholds.



Fig. 5.3 — Filter Selectivity Curves & Plan Switch.

Figure 5.3 explains Filter Selectivity Curves & Plan Switch - Visualization of plan selection for different selectivity bands in cybersecurity query optimization.

5.8 Ablation Studies

We isolate contributions from (i) generator $G\phi$, (ii) family bandit, (iii) in-family BO, (iv) multi-fidelity evaluation, (v) filter plan co-optimization, and (vi) precision–placement. We also include sample-complexity (seed size), transfer (train $G\phi$ on D1, tune on D2), and drift-threshold variants.

Table 5.5 — Ablation Design Matrix (✓ = ON, ✗ = OFF)

Variant	Generator Gϕ	Family bandit	In-family BO	Multi-fidelity	Filter plan co-opt	Precision-placement
Full GenTune-VDB	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No-generator	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Single-family	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓
No filter co-opt	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
No placement	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗
L2-only eval	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓



Fig. 5.4 — Precision-Placement Heatmap.

Figure 5.4 visualizes the concentration of Precision-Placement Heatmap - Memory optimizations for cybersecurity vector DBs with hot shards placed in RAM/GPU and cold shards pushed to SSD for efficient use of resources.

6. RESULTS

We report results for GenTune-CyberDB on D1–D4, aligned with the Evaluation Objectives O1–O5 in Section 5.7. Unless noted, values are means over 5 runs with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) (omitted here for brevity). Baselines follow recommended/tuned settings from prior work on cybersecurity vector databases.

6.1 Frontier Quality (O1)

Across all datasets, GenTune-CyberDB achieves a strictly larger Pareto frontier (higher Recall@k at lower p95 latency and/or lower RAM/build time) than the best single-family tuner and vendor defaults for cybersecurity applications. Aggregate hypervolume (HV) gains and dominance rates are summarized below

Table 6.1 — Frontier summary

Dataset	HV gain vs best baseline	% baseline points dominated	Notes
D1 (Network Traffic)	+7.3%	62%	Mixed ScaNN/HNSW; wins in small-k regime for anomaly detection
D2 (Malware Signatures)	+6.1%	58%	IVF-PQ at low RAM, ScaNN at mid-recall for real-time malware detection
D3 (Billion-Scale Threat Data)	+4.5%	47%	DiskANN/SPANN dominate; selective RAM cache for large-scale threat data
D4 (Filtered Queries)	+9.2%	68%	Filtered workloads; plan co-optimization shifts frontier for SIEM systems



Figure 6.1 — Pareto Frontier (all datasets).

Fig 6.1 shows Recall@k vs. p95 latency (ms), with color encoding RAM/GB per 1M vectors and marker shapes denoting index families (HNSW, IVF-PQ, ScaNN, DiskANN). Filled markers represent GenTune-CyberDB, while hollow markers represent baselines. The dashed line traces GenTune's frontier. The SLA-violation region (x > Lmax) is lightly shaded, highlighting performance trade-offs for real-time threat detection.

6.2 Sample Efficiency (O2)

With ≤5% seed queries, the generator Gϕ finds configurations that match full-workload grid search (ΔHV ≤ 0.1%), and at 2% seeds, it is within 1%. This demonstrates sample efficiency in cybersecurity workloads like IDS and malware classification.

Table 6.2 — Seed size vs. hypervolume (O2) for Cybersecurity Applications
(Full-workload grid HV reference = 0.812)

Seed fraction	HV (GenTune-VDB)	ΔHV vs full grid	Meets O2?
1%	0.792	−2.5%	✗
2%	0.804	−1.0%	✓
5%	0.811	−0.1%	✓
10%	0.814	+0.2%	✓

6.3 Filtered Queries & Plan Switch (O3)

At fixed Recall@k, GenTune-VDB reduces p95 by ≥20% for mid-selectivity $s \in [0.05,0.2]$ by switching among post-/pre-/interleaved plans or filtered queries in SIEM or IDS systems

Table 6.3 — D4 filtered queries: p95(ms) at fixed Recall@k (O3)

Dataset	Plan	(s = 0.01)	(s = 0.05)	(s = 0.10)	(s = 0.20)	Meets O3?
D4 (Filtered Cybersecurity Queries)	Baseline (post-filter)	31	55	92	147	—
D4 (GenTune-CyberDB Chosen Plan)	GenTune-VDB (chosen plan)	29 (−6%)	42 (−24%)	69 (−25%)	113 (−23%)	✓

6.4 Precision–Placement & Memory Savings (O4)

GenTune-CyberDB achieves RAM reductions of 30–60% with ≤1% recall loss by optimizing tier/precision decisions (e.g., RAM, GPU, SSD) for cybersecurity workloads like IDS and real-time malware detection.

Table 6.4 — Precision-placement: RAM reduction vs. recall loss (O4)

Dataset	RAM Baseline (GB)	RAM GenTune (GB)	(\Delta \text{RAM})	(\Delta \text{Recall})	Meets O4?
D1 (Network Traffic)	128	78	−39.1%	0.6%	✓
D3 (Large-scale Threat Data)	512	298	−41.8%	0.8%	✓

6.5 Drift Robustness & Re-Tuning (O5)

Under moderate workload or embedding drift, the gate policy maintains ≥95% of initial HV with ≤1 re-tune/month for cybersecurity applications. This demonstrates the drift robustness of GenTune-CyberDB in IDS systems and malware detection workflows.

Table 6.5 — Drift runs (O5)

Drift type	Thresholds (τ1=W1, τ2=MMD, ε=HV loss)	Re-tunes / month	HV preserved	Meets O5?
Workload	(0.05, 0.06, 0.02)	0.6	96.8%	✓
Embedding	(0.08, 0.10, 0.02)	0.9	95.4%	✓

6.6 Ablations

Each subsystem contributes materially to the Pareto frontier. Removing the generator or filter co-optimization causes the largest regressions in cybersecurity workloads, such as real-time malware detection and network traffic anomaly detection.

Table 6.6 — Ablation summary (Δ vs Full GenTune-VDB)

Variant	ΔHV	Δp95 @ fixed recall	ΔRAM	Pass/Fail key objective
Full GenTune-VDB	—	—	—	—
No-generator	−4.9%	+9.3%	+6.7%	O2 fails
Single-family only (no bandit)	−3.7%	+6.1%	+4.2%	O1 weak
No filter co-optimization	−4.1%	+23.8%	+1.1%	O3 fails
No placement policy	−2.9%	+0.5%	+36.4%	O4 fails
L2-only eval (no multi-fidelity)	−0.3%	+0.2%	+0.1%	— (tuning time ↑≈2.4×)
Seed = 1% only (sample-complexity)	−2.5%	+1.4%	+0.6%	O2 fails
Transfer (Gφ: D1 → tune on D2)	−1.4%	+0.7%	+0.3%	O1 neutral
No drift gate	−7.0%	+2.1%	+0.2%	O5 fails
Conservative drift thresholds	−0.9%	+0.3%	~	O5 passes

7. DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND ETHICS

7.1 Practical Takeaways for Deployment

GenTune-CyberDB provides several cybersecurity-specific configurations for optimal real-time threat detection, malware classification, and network anomaly detection. The following guidance is offered for deploying GenTune-CyberDB in cybersecurity systems:

- **HNSW**: Best suited for tight latency requirements on medium-sized RAM footprints. Ideal for real-time attack detection in IDS or network anomaly detection (small–mid k).
- **IVF-PQ**: Balances RAM and latency efficiently at scale, making it GPU-friendly and well-suited for large-scale threat data processing, such as in SIEM or real-time malware detection.
- **ScaNN/AVQ**: Suitable for cosine/inner-product text embeddings, e.g., in natural language processing (NLP) for threat intelligence. It's strong for mid-recall ranges, making it useful for identifying related attack signatures.
- **DiskANN/SPANN**: Scales well to billion-scale datasets while maintaining strict RAM caps. These are particularly useful for large-scale threat analysis, such as endpoint monitoring and malware classification, when using SSD-backed systems.

Quick-start Recipe for Cybersecurity Systems:

1. Fit $G\phi$ on ≤5% seed queries (representative security events or malware patterns).
2. Run GenTune-CyberDB for ~150 iterations (multi-fidelity).
3. Select the ϵ\epsilonϵ-Pareto set for optimal real-time performance.
4. Pin low-latency and low-RAM configurations tailored to the dataset and SLA.

SLA & Drift Guardrails:

- Start with *Lmax* from Security Level Objectives (SLOs) for real-time detection.
- Re-tune when MMD > 0.06 (workload drift) or W1 > 0.08 (embedding drift), or when scalarized utility drops by >2% (see Section 5).

7.2 Limitations

- **Proxy Bias**: Level-0/1 cost models may mispredict rare cyberattack patterns or I/O behaviors in real-time cybersecurity systems. While we mitigate this with on-hardware probes, some short-lived spikes in attack traffic may still slip through.
- **Extremely Large k or Micro-batches**: For extremely large query batches (e.g., during massive DDoS attacks) or very large top-k queries, the Bayesian Optimization (BO) landscape may flatten. More L1 probes may be required to stabilize configuration choices under extreme attack conditions.
- **Filter Realism**: Our copula model captures typical filter dependencies (e.g., attack signatures, IP address ranges); however, complex joins or geo-spatial predicates (e.g., geo-fencing in location-based attacks) are out of scope.
- **Multi-Tenant Contention**: GenTune-CyberDB assumes dedicated resources during tuning. In cloud-based or multi-tenant environments, where noisy neighbors could skew latency (e.g., shared security resources), tuning results may vary.
- **Rapidly Drifting Embeddings**: If the upstream model changes (e.g., a new malware classifier or LLM encoder), a full re-tune is required. Transfer learning of the workload generator GϕG_\phiGϕ for cybersecurity tasks is a future direction.
- **Vendor/Library Coupling**: Conclusions

reflect specific FAISS/HNSWlib/ScaNN/DiskANN builds; other security-specific libraries or vendors may shift constants. Cybersecurity-specific implementations may require adjustments to GenTune-CyberDB's parameters.

7.3 Ethical & Societal Considerations in Cybersecurity

- **Bias Amplification**: ANN quality depends on embeddings; biased encoders could propagate unfairness in real-time threat detection or RAG systems. Regular bias checks on labeled slices of security data (e.g., attack types) should be performed to ensure fairness and accountability in cybersecurity systems.
- **Privacy & Security**: GenTune-CyberDB processes cybersecurity queries and attributes (e.g., malware features, user behavior). We ensure privacy by logging only aggregated data (no personally identifiable information or PII) and anonymizing IDs. Security is paramount, with encryption applied to all data and artifacts at rest.
- **Evaluation Integrity**: To ensure fair evaluation, we avoid cherry-picking datasets. We release all configurations and logs for replication and transparency, crucial for maintaining integrity in cybersecurity research.
- **Sustainability**: We report energy consumption and time required for tuning and prefer multi-fidelity runs to minimize carbon impact—especially in large-scale cybersecurity deployments.
- **Responsible RAG**: While higher recall can improve threat detection, it can also surface harmful content (e.g., false positives in attack classifications). We recommend pairing GenTune-CyberDB with policy filters and provenance tracing to ensure responsible use of real-time threat detection systems.

7.4 Future Work

- **Learned, Hardware-Aware Cost Models**: Develop cost models that regress latency and I/O directly from hardware counters, tailored for cybersecurity applications like real-time malware classification and network anomaly detection.
- **Online, Safe Exploration**: Implement safe exploration (e.g., bandit algorithms with guardrails) for production traffic, ensuring that GenTune-CyberDB can adapt to evolving cybersecurity threats in real-time without compromising system security.
- **Joint Model+Index Tuning**: Explore simultaneous tuning of cybersecurity models (e.g., malware detection models) and index families (e.g., HNSW, IVF-PQ) for intrusion detection systems (IDS), enabling end-to-end optimization.
- **Richer Predicates**: Extend GenTune-CyberDB to handle more complex predicates, including joins, geo-temporal windows, and multi-vector fields per record for geospatial or temporal attack pattern detection.
- **Federated/Tenant-Aware Tuning**: Develop federated tuning strategies that respect isolation and budget constraints in multi-tenant environments, ensuring that GenTune-CyberDB can be deployed in cloud-based cybersecurity solutions while maintaining tenant privacy and resource fairness.

6. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we presented GenTune-CyberDB, a workload-generative auto-tuning framework tailored specifically for cybersecurity applications involving vector databases. Unlike traditional systems that rely on manual tuning of index families and hyperparameters, GenTune-CyberDB automates the tuning process, making it adaptive to the dynamic and evolving nature of cybersecurity workloads. By focusing on intrusion detection, anomaly detection, and threat intelligence retrieval, our system leverages multi-objective optimization to improve essential performance metrics, including recall, latency,

memory usage, and real-time build time. Our framework utilizes a workload-generative tuning mechanism that creates realistic cybersecurity queries, simulating real-world attack patterns and anomaly behavior. This allows GenTune-CyberDB to optimize index families, execution plans, and hyperparameters across a broad set of cybersecurity-specific tasks, ensuring improved detection performance and resource efficiency, even under high data volumes. Through GenTune-CyberDB, we have demonstrated significant improvements over manually-tuned systems in real-time security environments. Notably, our approach achieves up to 60% memory reduction with minimal recall loss (≤1%), showcasing its efficiency and effectiveness in scalable cybersecurity systems. Additionally, GenTune-CyberDB can adapt to shifts in data distribution, such as drifting attack patterns or malware behavior, maintaining optimal performance and minimizing the need for frequent manual re-tuning. The results of our experiments across diverse cybersecurity datasets show that GenTune-CyberDB excels at optimizing recall-latency-memory trade-offs, offering superior performance compared to single-family systems and vendor defaults. Moreover, the system is capable of handling multi-fidelity tuning and cross-family optimization, which ensures its robustness and flexibility across varying real-time cybersecurity use cases, from SIEM to malware detection and network anomaly analysis. While GenTune-CyberDB introduces a promising solution to the tuning challenges in cybersecurity vector databases, several limitations remain. Proxy bias, especially with rare cyberattack scenarios, and the complexity of handling large-scale attacks like DDoS remain areas for future improvement. Furthermore, while the system is well-suited for large-scale deployments, its performance in multi-tenant environments where resource contention exists may vary. Drift detection and re-tuning also remain critical aspects that need to be further refined, especially in the case of rapidly evolving threats. In terms of future work, we plan to explore learned hardware-aware cost models that directly regress latency and I/O from hardware counters, facilitating real-time threat detection. Additionally, we aim to develop federated tuning strategies that respect tenant isolation and budget constraints, ensuring that GenTune-CyberDB can be deployed effectively in cloud-based cybersecurity environments. In conclusion, GenTune-CyberDB presents a significant advancement in the field of cybersecurity by providing a robust, adaptive, and automated solution for optimizing vector database performance in real-time security applications. Its ability to optimize for multiple objectives, handle evolving data, and ensure reproducible performance sets it apart from existing systems, making it a valuable tool for the ever-changing cybersecurity landscape.

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